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Frazer, Wittgenstein and the Interpretation 
of Ritual Practice 
Felicia DeSmith 
  
Frazer and Wittgenstein, anthropologist and 
philosopher, are two thinkers whose works have 
profoundly shaped the development of their respective 
fields in the 20th Century.  The difference between them 
is that Frazer’s work is now widely dismissed, even 
ridiculed, while Wittgenstein’s ideas, such as language 
games, are still a strong part of the philosophical 
endeavor.  This fact is made interesting by the 
intersection of the works of these two.  Though his 
thoughts were not published until 1979,1 Wittgenstein 
began to comment on the faults in Frazer’s works as 
early as 1931,2 specifically upon his presentation of 
ritual practice among ‘primitive’ peoples as foolish and 
mistaken.  To Wittgenstein and many other modern 
thinkers, this patent dismissal of ritual practice was 
troubling and needed to be corrected.  Wittgenstein 
gives us a good starting place to understand the 
significance of ritual practice, but to accomplish it, one 
must go beyond his explanation in the Remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough. 
In this paper, I will discuss Frazer’s introduction of 
ritual practice as bad science, Wittgenstein’s textual 
response to Frazer, and the common view of 
Wittgenstein’s response held by his commentators. I 
will argue that Wittgenstein’s later view needs to be 
                                                
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. 
Retford: Brynmill Press Limited, 1979. 
2 1931 is an important date for understanding Wittgenstein’s 
thought in the Remarks. It falls between the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921) and the Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
It is in the Remarks that we begin to see the transformation of his 
ideas toward the form in which they appear in the Investigations. 
 60 
incorporated into the discussion, and expanded and 
clarified to truly show the reason for the persistent 
misunderstanding of ritual practice. 
Frazer 
 
James Frazer was an anthropologist of the 
Victorian era, very much a product of British colonial 
imperialist thought.  His major accomplishment is The 
Golden Bough, a 13 volume anthropological work, 
published over the years of 1890 to 1936, which 
describes ‘primitive’ magico-religious, or ritual practice 
and attempts to find overlying archetypes of thought 
and evolution.  Most importantly, Frazer attempts to use 
his findings to support an evolutionary theory of culture, 
that is, the theory that so-called ‘primitive’ religious 
thought can give modern thinkers an insight into the 
developmental history of their own culture and into the 
nature of religious belief (that is, its erroneousness). 
To this end, Frazer identifies ritual practice as a 
scientific endeavor, the initial groping of a primitive 
culture towards the understanding and certitude that 
science provides.  It is a clumsy prototype, a (perhaps 
necessary) precursor to the finished product that is 
rigorous scientific methodology.  Frazer says of 
magical practice, “its fundamental conception is 
identical with that of modern science; underlying the 
whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the 
order and uniformity of nature.”3  For Frazer, and for 
the purposes of this paper, science is defined as an 
exploratory activity based on empirical reasoning to try 
to explain, manipulate and control the properties of the 
world. 
                                                
3 Frazer, J. G. The Golden Bough (abridged edition). London: 
Macmillan, 1922. 49. 
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The reason that ritual practice is the prototype of 
science, and not, according to Frazer, science itself, is 
that it is based on a fundamental error. 
 
“The fatal flaw of magic lies not in its general 
assumption of a sequence of events determined by law, 
but in its total misconception of the nature of the 
particular laws which govern that sequence.” 4 
 
“Legitimately applied they yield science; 
illegitimately applied they yield magic, the bastard sister 
of science. It is therefore a truism, almost a tautology, to 
say that all magic is necessarily false and barren; for if it 
were ever to become true and fruitful, it would no longer 
be magic, but science.”5 
 
For Frazer, ritual practitioners are stricken with a basic 
misunderstanding of the practical principles that govern 
reality.  The reasoning that supports the ritual structure 
is faulty; it is a mistake.  And, working from a faulty 
beginning, the end is faulty as well, forever consigning 
magic to be that false and barren bastard sister of 
science. 
 
Wittgenstein 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s 
Golden Bough is a two-part work.  The first part was 
written between 1930 and 1931 after his first contact 
with The Golden Bough in the summer of 1930.  These 
remarks were dictated to a typist and much rearranged, 
seemingly as a kind of starting point for thought about 
his major later work, the Philosophical Investigations.  
The second set of remarks is quite fragmentary, actually 
rough notes and penciled scribbles found among his 
                                                
4 Ibid. 49. 
5 Ibid. 49-50. 
 62 
things posthumously by Elizabeth Anscombe, one of 
Wittgenstein’s literary executors, a translator and a 
commentator.  They appear to be meant as insertions to 
his earlier remarks.6  In the first part of the Remarks, 
one can definitely see the beginnings of some of the 
ideas that will characterize his later view. 
As a first step, Wittgenstein rejects Frazer’s 
notion that magico-religious practice is founded on a 
basic mistake in reasoning, essentially a kind of 
persistent stupidity, where the ritual practitioner insists 
on the correctness of his action in spite of its direct 
contradiction by the nature of reality.  Wittgenstein 
writes:  
“Frazer’s account of the magical and religious 
notions of men is unsatisfactory: it makes these notions 
appear as mistakes.” 7 
“It is very queer that all these practices are finally 
presented, so to speak, as stupid actions. 
But never does it become plausible that people do all this 
out of sheer stupidity.”8 
“Frazer says it is very difficult to discover the error 
in magic and this is why it persist for so long—because, 
for example, a ceremony which is supposed to bring rain 
is sure to appear effective sooner or later. … But then it 
is queer that people do not notice sooner that it does rain 
sooner or later anyway.”9 
 
The source of the strangeness of Frazer’s account, for 
Wittgenstein, is that magical and religious activity is 
defined by its erroneousness, and a ritual practitioner 
would have to be stupid to continue on practicing. 
                                                
6 Rhees, Rush. Introduction. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. 
By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Retford: Brynmill Press Limited, 1979. 
v-vi. 
7 Wittgenstein. 1979. 1. 
8 Ibid. 1. 
9 Ibid. 2. 
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At any rate, Wittgenstein goes on to point out 
that ritual practitioners, or ‘savages,’ have a clear 
understanding of what science is and what it should be 
used for, and they separate it from the things that 
should be addressed by ritual. 
 
“The same savage who, apparently in order to kill his 
enemy, sticks his knife through a picture of him, really 
does build his hut of wood and cuts his arrow with skill 
and not in effigy.”10 
 
This is to say, where science is needed, science is used.  
And it is used correctly.  Only when there is some need 
to accomplish or comment on something beyond the 
bounds of science, do men turn to magico-religious 
practices. 
This rejection of ritual practice as a purely 
scientific endeavor, as well as some of his comments in 
the Remarks 11  have led some of Wittgenstein’s 
commentators to characterize his position in the 
Remarks to be a new and complete theory of religion: 
an expressivist theory.  According to Brian Clack, 
“(b)oth Michael Banner and John Cook see the 
distinctive feature of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
religious phenomena as being the idea that such rites 
‘express attitudes’ towards things: towards the world, 
one’s own life and death, and so on.” 12   In the 
expressivist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Remarks, 
magico-religious and ritual practice is in no way an 
attempt to accomplish something based on the rules of 
nature, nor to explore some kind of speculation or 
                                                
10 Ibid. 4. 
11 Such as, “... magic does give representation to a wish; it 
expresses a wish.” Ibid. 4. 
12 Clack, Brian. Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999. 28. 
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theory about those same rules, but simply to express an 
emotion or stance on the human condition. 
I disagree completely with this analysis of 
Wittgenstein’s position in the Remarks.  It shows a 
shallow understanding of some of his more problematic 
notes.  This can be illustrated by a remark and its 
footnote: 
 
“If the adoption of a child is carried out by the 
mother pulling the child from beneath her clothes, then it 
is crazy to think that there is an error in this and that she 
believes she has borne the child. *” 13 
* “The same principle of make-believe, so dear to 
children, has led other peoples to employ a simulation of 
birth as a form of adoption. ... A woman will take a boy 
whom she intends to adopt and push or pull him through 
her clothes; ever afterwards he is regarded as her very 
son...” (The Golden Bough, pp. 14, 15)”14 
 
In this case, if we just read the remark itself, one can 
see the idea the expressivists are arguing from.  The 
woman does not believe that she has born the child, but 
it is the case that she has shown something, that is her 
intent to adopt the child and her commitment to provide 
for him.  At this point in the Remarks, it seems that 
Wittgenstein considers the matter closed, making no 
more explicit commentary about this particular case, 
and moves on to his next example.  
But if we look also at the note Wittgenstein 
includes from The Golden Bough, the expressivist 
analysis of that action becomes complicated.  In not 
taking Wittgenstein’s remark as a direct response to a 
statement of Frazer’s, the commentators are missing a 
vital piece of the puzzle.  It is not just that the woman 
indicates that she wishes to adopt the boy, it is that 
                                                
13 Wittgenstein, 1979. 4. 
14 Ibid. 4, footnote. 
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through the performance of that ritual, the boy has 
become ‘as her very son.’  A change has occurred both 
in the social structure of the group and in the nature of 
the relationship between the woman and the boy.  Their 
bond has been altered and cemented.  It is clear that the 
ritual was undertaken in order to accomplish something, 
that is, the change in the relationship between them.  
In general, in rituals that resemble the one above 
in their form and intent, the ritual practitioners not only 
have a very clear idea of what they want to accomplish, 
they also have a very clear idea of how it comes about.  
By performing a symbolic birth, the adoptive mother is 
seeking to effect a change on the symbolic attributes of 
herself and her adoptive son (i.e. their relationship to 
one another, both in a functional social way and in a 
meaningful, ‘ontological’ way; he becomes her very 
son).  This change occurs on the basis of the understood 
properties and mechanics of the manipulation of 
symbolic attributes in much the same way a 
mathematician knows that induction works on the basis 
of the properties and mechanics of the set of natural 
numbers.  The change or proof that we want to 
accomplish in either case is borne out because of the 
very nature of the mechanics that change operates on.  
In both cases, it must hold. 
 
Critique of Wittgenstein’s Remarks 
 
In my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s response 
to Frazer, Wittgenstein is trying to show that Frazer is 
confused in exactly the same way a philosopher 
becomes confused; moreover, in my analysis, to clear 
up this confusion is the agenda of Wittgenstein’s entire 
career. It is the single common element between the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical 
Investigations.  The aim of both is to show that the 
cause of philosophical torment is a specific sort of 
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confusion about what can be said, or about what can be 
evaluated in what contexts. 
In order to properly get at this confusion, we need to be 
able to talk in terms of depth grammar.  To do that, I 
need to turn to the Philosophical Investigations, first 
published in 1953, many years after the first remarks on 
Frazer were written, but which has much of its 
preparatory work in the Remarks itself. In section 664 
of the former, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
“In the use of words one might distinguish ‘surface 
grammar’ from ‘depth grammar.’  What immediately 
impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the 
way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part 
of its use—as it were—that can be taken in by the ear.  
And now compare the depth grammar, say, of the word 
“to mean,” with what its surface grammar would lead us 
to expect.”15 
 
In other words, surface grammar is that which involves 
the rules of syntax that words have within a sentence 
and depth grammar is the meaning of an utterance 
within the language game to which it belongs.  
Moreover, depth grammars exist only as an attribute of 
the language game to which they belong; a depth 
grammar cannot exist separate from its context, its 
language game.  
Philosophical confusion arises when one takes a 
language object, such as a noun or a verb (i.e. “God” or 
“to mean,” etc.), and tries to make sense of it on the 
basis of its surface grammar alone.  Mere syntax does 
not reveal the meaning of a language object in its 
language game, nor does it even show to what language 
game the language object belongs.  If we act in 
                                                
15 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe. 3rd Ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1968. § 664.  
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ignorance of the proper context of a language object, 
then of course we become confused. 
In order to understand the proper domain of a 
language game and the function of the language objects 
that belong to it, Wittgenstein proposes the idea of a 
perspicuous presentation.  The word he uses in German 
is übersicht, a kind of complete, ultimate sight.  Rhees 
notes that he only chooses this word in translation 
because there is no English word that means precisely 
what Wittgenstein means by übersicht.  At that time, no 
one was using the word ‘perspicuous’ in English to 
have any specific connotations.  I find that the fact that 
it was unsullied, lacking accretions, is what makes the 
idea intelligible to readers of English in the first place.16  
Übersicht is also sometimes translated as ‘synoptic 
view’ or ‘bird’s eye view.’ 17   But what does this 
‘ultimate sight’ see?  What is its purpose?  Wittgenstein 
attempts to explain in the Remarks: 
“For us, the conception of a perspicuous 
presentation [a way of setting out the whole field together 
by making easy the passage from one part of it to another] 
is fundamental.”18 
“This perspicuous presentation makes possible that 
understanding which consists just in the fact that we ‘see 
the connections.’”19 
Nowhere, though, does Wittgenstein explain or name 
the object of übersicht, beyond saying that it allows us 
to “see the connections.” 
Wittgenstein, in a sense, gives us two ways to 
look at the same thing, two ways of pointing at the heart 
of the matter that he never names or explicitly 
characterizes.  On the one side, there are the language 
objects and their depth grammars.  On the other side is 
                                                
16 Wittgenstein, 1979. 9, translator’s note. 
17 Clack, 1999. 58. 
18 Wittgenstein, 1979. 9. 
19 Ibid. 9. 
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the comprehension of the connections between the 
elements of a language game.  But what of the 
connections themselves?  What is the thing that we 
understand? What is the thing that is made of the 
connections?  In order to do what Wittgenstein wants to 
do with language, someone has to define and give an 
account of this thing.  Wittgenstein never did because 
he wanted to avoid proposing some kind of unified 
theory, yet in order for his account of language to make 
sense, that thing needs to be rigorously explained.  To 
give a clear view of this hidden concept is what I will 
now try to accomplish, though in doing so I will go 
beyond that which Wittgenstein himself explicitly 
stated. 
To understand a language game, to have a clear 
perspicuous presentation of it, one must be aware of the 
connections between the elements of a language game.  
These elements are the language objects, their depth 
grammars, how they interrelate, how they function on 
one another, etc.  It is to have an understanding of the 
complete combinatorial, permutational properties of the 
relationships of all the elements to one another.  It is to 
understand the fundamental nature of the concepts of 
the language game and how they function within that 
language game. It could be called something like 
‘fundamental concept functionality.’  It could also be 
called the metaphysics of a language game; though I 
hesitate to use that term, since the very property that 
made ‘perspicuous’ for Rhees a good candidate for 
specificity in philosophical terminology makes 
‘metaphysics’ a very bad candidate for it.  In 
philosophy, the term ‘metaphysics’ has become so 
overburdened with accretions that it cannot be applied 
to something so narrow and specific as what we are 
speaking about here.  Though the power of the analogy 
cannot be denied, and it is useful to keep it in mind, I 
am going to attempt to use the unburdened new term 
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‘fundamental concept functionality’ where its 
unburdenedness does not complicate understanding. 
The idea that the heart of a language game, its 
machine code, as it were, is a kind of cohered whole of 
the combinatorial relationships of the elements of that 
language game suggests to me a kind of taxonomy of 
language games, based on the shared elements of 
fundamental concept functionality between related 
language games.  It is useful to think of language games 
themselves as being interrelated, by a sort of family 
resemblance model, into a loose framework that gives a 
picture of language as a whole.  Since language cannot 
occur outside of a language game, all communication 
must share some basic element that makes each 
instance of communication able to be considered a part 
of a language game.  All language must have a common 
aspect of its functional concept functionality in order 
for it to be language at all. This gives us the first tier in 
the taxonomy of language games, that is, language 
games themselves. 
The second tier of the taxonomy would contain 
broad categories of types of language games, such as 
social interaction, science and religion.  The second tier 
should make some distinctions between different 
domains of language activity, for even at this level, a 
degree of specificity and exclusion begins to arise.  
Though this taxonomic view is quite helpful in 
illustrating the different ways that language is divided 
up by its use, it is important to remember that the 
groupings occur because of shared elements of the 
‘metaphysics’ of the language games involved.  The 
spaces between the branches of the taxonomic tree 
represent ‘lines in the sand,’ across which language 
objects and concepts from specific language games 
should not (and cannot sensically) be transported. 
Generally speaking, then, Frazer’s mistake is in 
taking ideas out of one language game and bringing 
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them into another, taking them out of the language 
game of religion and subjecting them to the 
‘metaphysics’ of the science language game.  He is 
violating a divide in the taxonomic organization.  What 
he does, over and over again in the pages of The Golden 
Bough, is seize upon some idea or practice, loosen it 
from the tethers of meaning and significance that tie it 
into the use and function of the language game of ritual, 
and take it singularly into a strange environment where 
its original meaning and significance, its use and 
function, are no longer valid. 
Specifically, the problem with Frazer’s 
transportation of religious language objects into the 
science language game is that the science language 
game does not admit of an important aspect of the 
fundamental concept functionality of the religion or 
ritual language game.  Above, when we looked at the 
example of adoption through the performance of a 
symbolic birth, we saw that the important part of the 
ritual is that the symbolic attributes of the mother and 
son were altered; that is, she became his very mother, 
and he became her very son.  In magico-religious 
practice and ritual, the symbolic attributes of a person 
(i.e. ‘is the son of,’ ‘is sinful,’ ‘is ritually pure,’ etc.) are 
very important.  In science, they are trivial.  One cannot 
determine if a person is sinful using scientific 
implements, nor does it tell a scientist anything about 
the empirical properties of that person.  In addition, the 
rules of the science language game do not acknowledge 
that through the manipulation of symbols, symbolic 
attributes can be changed. 
This idea, so central to magico-religious and 
ritual practice, of the nontriviality of symbolic attributes 
and the ability of symbolic attributes to be altered 
through symbolic action (or performance) is something 
I am going to call ‘symbolic causality.’  It is the aspect 
of the fundamental concept functionality of the magico-
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religious language game that allows for the 
relationships between symbols, symbolic attributes, and 
symbolic actions to be acted upon reliably, 
mechanically, in the same way, as I mention above, that 
inductive proofs work reliably, mechanically because of 
the relationships between the elements in the series of 
natural numbers.  
Take for example, in Christianity, the 
transubstantiation of the host.  In a scientific account of 
it, ritual participants listen as the ritual practitioner 
speaks some words, calling on his God to bless the food 
that is the center of the ritual.  Then the participants eat 
some bread and drink some wine. And at the end of it, 
they believe that in some way they have partaken of the 
body of their savior.  They have all pretended, like 
make-believe, that the wine became blood and that 
there is something salvific in the action of drinking it.  
But nothing empirical has changed, except that now 
they have eaten and drunk a bit.  Yet anyone familiar 
with the Christian sacrament of the Eucharist knows 
that to dismiss it as make-believe is to completely 
misunderstand the point of the ritual.  Most do not 
believe that the wine really, actually becomes blood, 
but they do believe that the wine has taken on the 
symbolic attributes of Christ’s blood, being both his 
blood and just wine at the same time.  In an inescapably 
analogous way, a woman does not believe that she 
actually gave birth to her adoptive son, but he is still her 
son.  This fine distinction, empirically wine but 
symbolically blood, is not given any importance in the 
science language game, but it is of vital importance to 
the language game of Christianity. 
Science does not admit of the validity of 
symbolic causality; in the fundamental concept 
functionality of science, it does not exist.  Indeed, the 
very idea is in some ways anathema to the language 
game itself.  Small wonder, then, that when Frazer tries 
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to make a scientific account of a ritual practice, he sees 
it as crazy and wrong.  And small wonder that readers 
of Frazer who are sensitive to the differences between 
science and magic, like Wittgenstein, are frustrated 
constantly by his accounts because it is so gratingly 
apparent that he is missing something vital. 
The way in which Frazer could have conducted 
his anthropological work without it being wrongheaded 
and disrespectful would be, instead of evaluating ritual 
thought and action in terms of science and trying to 
patch up ‘savage’ practice and make it appear rational, 
to have attempted to understand and describe the 
important aspects of ritual practice in their own terms.  
In light of the discussion in this paper, the proper aim of 
anthropology and religious studies 20  should be 
description, to understand and describe the fundamental 
concept functionality, the metaphysical properties, of a 
specific ritual language game by observing the thought 
and activity of ritual practitioners. The aim should be to 
provide Wittgenstein’s übersicht, to provide a 
perspicuous presentation of what goes on and why, to 
prevent Frazer’s kind of confusion and 
mischaracterization regarding the elements of ritual 
activity. 
 
                                                
20 And, according to Wittgenstein, the proper aim of philosophy as 
well. 
